JOSAPRAT

Journal Of Spirituality And Practical Theology
Sekolah Tinggi Teologi Injili Indonesia Samarinda
Vol. 2 No. 2 (2026): 105-123
p-ISSN: 3032-7989 | e-ISSN: 3063-2315

Comparative Study of the Concept of Death according to Seneca and Paul

Bonnarty Steven Silalahi[1]
Universitas Pelita Harapan
bonnarty.silalahi@uph.edu

Histori
Submitted : 15 December 2025
Revised : 26 January 2026
Accepted : 30 January 2026
Published : 31 January 2026

DOI
https://doi.org/10.69668/josaprat.v2i2.164

Deskripsi
This article is a research project in the field of Christian spirituality and pastoral theology that takes up the topic of comparing the concepts of death and consolation strategies in Seneca and Paul and their implications for faith accompaniment in grief and anxiety about death.

Sitasi
Silalahi, B. (2026). Comparative Study of the Concept of Death according to Seneca and Paul. *Journal Of Spirituality And Practical Theology*, *2*(2), 105–123. https://doi.org/10.69668/josaprat.v2i2.164

Abstract

Death holds a central place in philosophical and theological reflection and remains a major source of contemporary anxiety, especially within Christian spirituality and pastoral theology. This article compares Seneca's Stoic understanding of death with Paul's early Christian vision, focusing on their conceptual frameworks and consolatory strategies. Using qualitative, library-based research, it analyzes Seneca's De brevitate vitae, Epistulae morales, and selected tragedies alongside key Pauline texts (1 Corinthians 15; Romans 5–8; Philippians 1:21–23; 1 Thessalonians 4:13–18). The comparison is structured around four themes: the ontology of death, eschatology, the constitution of the subject, and modes of consolation. Seneca presents death as a morally neutral and cosmically necessary reality within the order of logos, functioning as philosophical therapy through meditatio mortis and exemplary deaths. Paul, by contrast, depicts death as the enemy and the "wages of sin," transformed by Christ's resurrection and communal eschatological hope. These contrasting models offer distinct resources for addressing death anxiety and pastoral care today.

Keywords: *Seneca; Paul; Death; Comparative Study*

Abstrak

Kematian menempati posisi sentral dalam refleksi filosofis dan teologis serta tetap menjadi sumber utama kecemasan manusia modern, khususnya dalam spiritualitas Kristen dan teologi pastoral. Artikel ini membandingkan pemahaman Stoa tentang kematian menurut Seneca dengan visi Kristen awal Paulus, dengan menyoroti kerangka konseptual dan strategi penghiburan yang mereka tawarkan. Melalui penelitian kualitatif berbasis studi pustaka, artikel ini menganalisis *De brevitate vitae*, *Epistulae morales*, dan beberapa tragedi karya Seneca, serta teks-teks kunci Paulus (1 Korintus 15; Roma 5–8; Filipi 1:21–23; 1 Tesalonika 4:13–18). Perbandingan dilakukan berdasarkan empat tema: ontologi kematian, eskatologi, konstitusi subjek, dan mode penghiburan. Seneca memandang kematian sebagai realitas yang netral secara moral dan niscaya secara kosmis dalam tatanan *logos*, serta menggunakannya sebagai terapi filosofis melalui *meditatio mortis* dan teladan kematian. Sebaliknya, Paulus menggambarkan kematian sebagai musuh dan "upah dosa" yang ditransformasi oleh kebangkitan Kristus dan harapan eskatologis yang bersifat komunal. Kedua model ini menawarkan sumber konseptual yang berbeda dalam menanggapi kecemasan akan kematian dan praktik pendampingan pastoral masa kini.

Kata kunci: Seneca; Paulus; Kematian; Studi Banding

INTRODUCTION

Death is one of the oldest and at the same time most urgent themes in philosophical and religious reflection. On the one hand, it is an inescapable fact of the human condition; on the other, it gives rise to profound existential anxiety. Recent psychological literature shows that death anxiety plays a transdiagnostic role across a range of mental disorders, from anxiety to depression, and even functions as a latent factor that is often overlooked in clinical practice (Iverach et al., 2014). More recent studies emphasize that religiosity and spiritual meaning frameworks are consistently correlated with decreased fear of death and increased acceptance of mortality (Husain, Ammar, et al., 2024; Pandya & Kathuria, 2021).

Within the Roman Stoic tradition, Seneca occupies a distinctive position as a philosopher who not only *writes* about death but also *performs* the art of "learning to die" through his own life and death. Early classical studies such as Noyes have shown that for Seneca, death is understood as an *indifferens* (something morally neutral and beyond our control) so that what is truly significant is one's inner disposition and use of time during life, not the event of dying itself (Noyes, 1973). Readings of *De brevitate vitae* show how the deaths of figures, such as M. Livius Drusus, are used by Seneca to expose human limitations in managing time and the illusions people harbour about the future (Currie, 2020).

Fantham, for instance, has shown how the characters who live and die in *Troades* form a kind of "dramatic laboratory" on death and the dead (Fantham, 2019), while more recent studies highlight how expressions such as *mors individua* and *aeqva* suggest a radical equality in death in the face of tragic fate (Coomans, 2024). Biographical–literary work on *The Deaths of Seneca* has further shown that Seneca's own death has been interpreted and staged by the tradition as the performative climax of his Stoic ethics (Ker, 2010).

Meanwhile, in the corpus of Paul of Tarsus (especially 1 Corinthians 15 and Philippians 1:21–23) death appears not as an *indifferens* but as the "last enemy" that has been defeated through Christ's resurrection and at the same time as a "gain" for those who "live in Christ." Engberg-Pedersen, for example, compares how Paul in Philippians and Seneca in *Epistula* 93 speak about life after death and its implications for present existence, showing similarities in consolatory form but radical differences at the metaphysical level (Engberg-Pedersen, 2017). Muir's recent monograph maps Paul and Seneca within the ancient consolation tradition, highlighting how the rhetorical strategies and narrative structures of consolation in each figure converge and diverge at key points (Muir, 2024a).

In another article on Philippians 3:20, Muir compares the respective "narratives of consolation" in Paul and Seneca, and argues that Paul's orientation toward a "politeuma in heaven" yields a horizon of hope that cannot be reduced to a Stoic cosmology, even though on the surface the rhetoric of consolation appears similar (Muir, 2024b). Luckensmeyer and Neil read 1 Thessalonians as a letter of consolation under the influence of Seneca and ancient consolatory literature, indicating that Paul creatively adopts yet simultaneously transforms the rhetorical patterns typical of consolatory practice in the Mediterranean world of his time (Luckensmeyer & Neil, 2015). In addition, a recent study by Case compares the ethics of love in Paul and Seneca and demonstrates both convergences and differences in how the two

thinkers understand relationality, suffering, and sacrifice (Case, 2024). While a growing body of scholarship has placed Paul and Seneca in dialogue (often through the lenses of consolation, ethics, or rhetorical form), there is still no sustained, concept-centred comparison that takes death itself (its moral valence, ontological status, and eschatological horizon) as the primary object of analysis across their major texts. This article addresses that gap by foregrounding death as the organising problem rather than a subsidiary motif within consolatory discourse.

Beyond classical and biblical studies, the psychology of religion literature highlights that the way a tradition interprets death (whether as a neutral transition, punishment, threat, or path to fulfilment) directly shapes the structure of death anxiety and the forms of consolation practiced at pastoral and clinical levels (Husain, Malik, et al., 2024; Menzies & Whittle, 2022). Yet the concrete relationship between concepts of death in classical texts such as Seneca and biblical texts such as Paul, on the one hand, and contemporary psychological discourse on death anxiety, on the other, remains relatively underexplored.

Against this background, the present article aims to offer a focused comparative study of death in the thought of Seneca and Paul by examining both its ontological dimensions and its ethical–eschatological implications. More specifically, this study traces how Seneca construes death as a cosmically neutral fact that nonetheless bears significant pedagogical functions, as reflected in his philosophical dialogues and tragedies, and how Paul understands death as an enemy already defeated yet still operative in the experience of believers, and simultaneously as a "gain" for those who "live in Christ," within the framework of consolatory narrative and eschatological hope. The study thus moves at the intersection of Roman Stoic philosophy, Pauline theology, and modern psychological discourse on death anxiety.

METHODS

The research questions to be addressed are as follows. First, how does Seneca articulate death in his key texts, both as an ontological fact and as an instrument of philosophical therapy for the anxious soul? Here, *De brevitate vitae* and the moral letters will be central, with particular attention to the role of *meditatio mortis* and *exempla* as strategies for taming the fear of death (Currie, 2020; Novosad, 2024; Noyes, 1973). Second, how does Paul understand and configure death within a Christological–eschatological framework, especially in 1 Corinthians 15 and Philippians 1:21–23, and how does this configuration function in a consolatory manner for suffering and grieving communities? This question will be situated within a conversation with the ancient consolation tradition and recent interpretations that place Paul in dialogue with Seneca and with contemporary consolatory practices (Case, 2024; Engberg-Pedersen, 2017; Luckensmeyer & Neil, 2015; Muir, 2024a; Muir, 2022). Third, to what extent do formal similarities (consolation, emotion management, training for death) mask substantive differences (the moral status of death, the structure of hope, the locus of salvation) between Seneca and Paul, and what are the implications of these differences for a philosophical–theological understanding of contemporary death anxiety? In connection with this third question, the study will engage findings from the psychology of religion and cognitive–behavioural therapy that integrate religious and philosophical resources

in addressing death anxiety (Menzies dan Whittle; Pandya dan Kathuria; Husain dkk.; Iverach dkk.).

Methodologically, this research is qualitative and library-based, proceeding in three main steps: (1) textual–philosophical analysis of relevant Senecan works on death; (2) biblical-theological analysis of Pauline texts that foreground the themes of death and resurrection; and (3) thematic comparison that maps similarities and differences along ontological, moral, eschatological, and ethical dimensions.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Death in Seneca's Thought

Seneca's understanding of death cannot be separated from the broader Stoic framework. In Stoic ethics, only virtue (*virtus*) is truly good and only moral vice is truly evil; everything outside this (health, wealth, reputation, and even life and death) can be classified as *adiaphora*, things that are morally "indifferent." Death, as far as the structure of value is concerned, is not an evil, but a natural and inescapable event within a rationally ordered cosmos.

Noyes shows that Seneca consistently places death within this category of the "indifferent": he does not deny that human beings instinctively avoid death, but he insists that rational judgment can dismantle the illusion that dying itself is "the greatest evil" (Noyes, 1973). Two levels in Seneca's positioning of death become evident here. Ontologically, death is part of *fatum*, the inevitable cosmic causal network. From this perspective, dying is a change of form rather than annihilation: a kind of *restitutio* of the body's elements to the universe. Evaluatively and morally, death can become "good" or "bad" only insofar as it is related to the subject's inner disposition. To die cowardly, to flee from duty, or to do so for ignoble ends is a *vium turpe*; to die in order to preserve moral integrity and inner freedom can be an *exitus honestus* (Griffiths, 1999).

If at the doctrinal level of Stoicism death is an *adiaphoron*, at the practical level Seneca makes it the object of intense spiritual exercise. His moral prose (especially the *Epistulae morales* and *De brevitate vitae*) can be read as a therapeutic programme against the fear of death. Noyes notes that for Seneca the fundamental error is not the mere fact that human beings fear death, but that they fear "the wrong thing": they tremble before the end of biological life, yet do not tremble before a life that is wrongly and vainly lived (Noyes, 1973). *Meditatio mortis* therefore functions as a technique of perspective reversal: by "bringing death before the mind" repeatedly, the subject is forced to distinguish between what is truly important and what is mere social habit or empty ambition.

Novosad's study clarifies the pedagogical dimension of this strategy. He shows that Seneca does not simply instruct his pupils to contemplate death in the abstract, but constructs a series of historical *exempla* (figures who die in particular ways) as a kind of "remedy" for the phobia of death (Novosad, 2024). By presenting narratives of deaths that are courageous, serene, or even ironic, Seneca builds an imaginative repository that his pupils can draw upon when anxiety about death arises. Currie offers a detailed reading of how the story of the death

of M. Livius Drusus in *De brevitate vitae* 6.1–2 is used by Seneca to spotlight the human paradox of being busy designing the future while forgetting that this future is always threatened by the sudden interruption of death (Currie, 2020).

From a contemporary perspective, Hoffpauir interprets Seneca's exercises concerning fear of death as a systematic effort to replace unruly affective responses with stable rational judgments (Hoffpauir, 2021). When Seneca urges us to say each day, "perhaps today is my last," this is not passive fatalism but a strategy to compel the mind to prioritise what truly matters. Seneca's moral prose thus displays three primary functions of *meditatio mortis*: a cognitive function, correcting the mistaken judgment that death is the supreme evil; an affective function, reducing the intensity of fear through repeated imaginative exposure to death; and an ethical–practical function, directing attention to the wise use of time so that life becomes "dense with meaning" before death arrives.

Another dimension that cannot be ignored is the relationship between death and freedom (*libertas*). In the Roman Stoic tradition, including in Seneca, suicide can be a rational option when external conditions render it no longer possible to live in a dignified way. Griffiths, in two articles on Cato and Roman suicide, explains that Stoics regard *exitus voluntarius* as a means of preserving moral integrity when all other options for living virtuously have been closed off (Griffiths, 1999). Ker, in his monograph *The Deaths of Seneca*, shows how Seneca's own death, forced suicide under Nero, has been received throughout history as the culmination of his teaching on *libertas* and his stance toward death. Ker traces how the narratives of Tacitus, Cassius Dio, and later Renaissance and modern traditions "stage" Seneca's death as a philosophical drama: slowly flowing blood, the repeated opening of veins, and philosophical composure amid bodily suffering. In this construction, death is not merely the end of a biography but a final "teaching act."

At the doctrinal level, Seneca frequently stresses that the exit from life is always "open": no one is truly imprisoned in an unbearable condition so long as weapons, the sea, bridges, and poisons remain. This statement is not a glorification of violence but an assertion that no political power can fully dominate a subject who is prepared to die for the sake of inner freedom. Hill shows that such a mindset is what makes suicide a form of "Roman death" laden with cultural significance (Hill, 2004).

Even so, both Ker and Inwood remind us that Seneca is far from promoting indiscriminate suicide: he repeatedly insists on the need to weigh whether death at a given point is truly more "rational" than continuing to live in order to fulfil moral obligations (Edwards, 2007; Ker, 2010). Here it becomes clear that for Seneca death remains an *adiaphoron*, but the decision to die or to live is a matter of Stoic *phronesis*, practical wisdom of the most serious kind. If Seneca's philosophical prose arranges death in calm and argumentative language, his tragedies present death in its most extreme forms: blood, mutilation, cries, and despair.

In her chapter "Death and the Dead in Seneca's *Troades*," Fantham shows that war, the destruction of the city, and the deaths of key figures (Priam, Hector, Astyanax, Polyxena) are not mere tragic background but vehicles for exploring how human beings make sense of loss,

grief, and ruptured futures (Fantham, 2019). Coomans highlights two key expressions in *Troades*, *mors individua* and *aeqva*, as markers that death unites enemies and victims within a single field of radical equality: in the face of death, social hierarchies collapse (Coomans, 2024). Graf, in his chapter "Hope, Fear, and the Future in Seneca's *Troades*," reads Seneca's tragedy as an "affective cosmos" in which hope and fear concerning the future (especially the future of children (Astyanax) and of honour (Polyxena)) are dissected with great nuance (Graf, 2024b). In this sense, tragedy becomes a "dramatic commentary" on what is articulated in more tranquil terms in the philosophical prose.

Pypłacz proposes that many motifs in Senecan tragedy: unburied corpses, mangled bodies, nocturnal terrors, contain something that may be called "Gothic" *avant la lettre* (Pypłacz, 2016). Yet he insists that these elements do not serve mere sensationalism; physical horror visualises the extreme consequences of unrestrained passion and emotion. In other words, the blood and mutilation on stage are "icons" of a soul shattered by *ira*, *libido*, and ambition. Weiss goes so far as to argue that Seneca's tragedies can be read as a "response to Stoic criticism of poetry": by shifting the centre of conflict from a clash between humans and external fate to an internal conflict within the agents themselves, Seneca attempts to make tragedy more compatible with the Stoic moral agenda (Weiss, 2021). In this framework, tragic death is not a failure of Stoicism but an ethical experiment: a way of showing, through extremity, what happens when Stoic principles are ignored.

Ker, in *The Deaths of Seneca*, links these tragedies with Seneca's own death. He shows that the reception tradition often reads the plays as a kind of "rehearsal" for Seneca's philosophical death: as if the author had long contemplated the many faces of death before undergoing it himself (Ker, 2009b). Seneca's tragedies therefore constitute an "affective laboratory of death," characterised by: extreme expression, that is, highly physical and often repulsive depictions of death in order to expose the destructive consequences of unleashed passions; experiments in perspective, inviting the audience to view death from the standpoint of victims, perpetrators, witnesses, and even ghosts, thereby enriching the imagination of what it means "to die" for different subjects; and pedagogical reflection, promoting Stoic discourse about emotional control, acceptance of *fatum*, and the dangers of grounding life's meaning in fragile goods such as power and honour.

From the foregoing, it is clear that for Seneca death occupies an ambivalent yet carefully structured position. Ontologically, death is an inseparable part of the order of the cosmos; it is morally neutral and unavoidable. Noyes, Inwood, and Hoffpauir all emphasise how Seneca seeks to lead his pupils to see death as something "absorbed" into a rational view of nature rather than as an irrational threat (Edwards, 2007; Hoffpauir, 2021; Noyes, 1973). Ethically, death is a moment of character-testing: it can be the summit of honour or the proof of moral failure, depending on the subject's motives and inner disposition (Griffiths, 1999; Hill, 2004). Pedagogically, death is an instrument of self-formation: through *meditatio mortis*, the use of *exempla*, and affective experimentation in tragedy, Seneca seeks to transform how his pupils think about, feel about, and ultimately face death (Currie, 2020; Fantham, 2019; Graf, 2024a; Ker, 2009b; Novosad, 2024; Pypłacz, 2016; Weiss, 2021).

Death is thus both a boundary and a tool of self-formation. As a boundary, it reminds us that human time is finite and that every postponement of philosophy is an existential risk. As a tool, it is employed by Seneca to train courage, clarity of judgment, and inner freedom: one learns to live well precisely by continually looking death in the face. This framework will become a crucial point of comparison when we turn to Paul. If for Seneca death is primarily a cosmic fact that can be given ethical and pedagogical meaning, for Paul it is situated within a Christological–eschatological drama as the "last enemy" that has been defeated and at the same time the gateway to communion with Christ. It is this difference in horizon that sharpens our comparative analysis of how these two figures confront the fear of death and invite their communities to live (and die) meaningfully.

Death in Paul's Thought

If for Seneca death is primarily situated within the framework of a rational cosmos and an ethic of individual virtue, for Paul it always appears within a Christological–eschatological drama: death as enemy, as "wages of sin," and at the same time as a reality already conquered in the resurrection of Christ.

In Romans 5–8, Paul personifies death as a power that works together with sin and the law to enslave humanity. In Romans 6:23, death is described as the "wages of sin," not merely a biological consequence but a forensic and cosmic reality marking humanity's separation from God. Park shows that in 1 Corinthians 15:20–28, "death" (*thanatos*) appears as an apocalyptic enemy with a dual dimension: in a cosmic sense, death as a power that rules over creation; and in a forensic sense, death as punishment for sin, closely linked to the concept of judgment (Park, 2020). Thus, when Paul refers to death as "the last enemy to be destroyed" (1 Cor 15:26), he is not speaking of something neutral, but of a power opposed to God's creational intent.

Death, therefore, is not merely an object of moral analysis but also an actor within the drama of salvation: it appears, resists, and is then conquered. Within this horizon, fear of death is not simply a psychological reaction but is understandable as a response to a cosmic enemy. Yet because this enemy has been "defeated" in Christ's resurrection, Paul can speak of a radical transformation in the meaning of death for those who are "in Christ": death remains serious, but it is no longer decisive.

If death is an enemy, Paul's answer is not the escape of the soul from the body, but the resurrection of the body. In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul rejects any view of resurrection as mere "immortality of the soul"; he insists on the genuine transformation of the body. Wright emphasizes that Paul's theology of resurrection cannot be separated from his conception of creation: Christ's resurrection is the beginning of the renewal of creation, not merely a guarantee of the continued existence of individuals after death (Wright, 2019). Thus, when Paul declares that death is "swallowed up in victory" (1 Cor 15:54), he is not envisioning an escape from the material world, but a radical transformation of a perishable and corrupted creation.

Recent examination of the details of 1 Corinthians 15 underscores that for Paul, resurrection involves both continuity and discontinuity of the body. Hollon argues that in 1

Corinthians 15:42–44, Paul draws on Hellenistic cosmology and Aristotelian notions of change to explain how the present "perishable" body can be transformed into an imperishable body without losing its identity (Hollon, 2025). Wibowo stresses, in pastoral terms, that for Paul Christ's resurrection guarantees that death is not the end of God's relationship with humanity, but the gateway to a purified relationship (Wibowo & Salurante, 2020). Death, then, is not a point of disappearance but a point of transition toward a new mode of existence already anticipated in Christ's resurrection.

Paul's most famous statement about death is perhaps Philippians 1:21: "For to me, to live is Christ and to die is gain." At first glance, this sentence seems very close in tone to Stoic discourse (for instance Seneca), which sometimes regards death as a possible "gain" under certain conditions. However, a careful reading reveals a fundamental difference. Holloway analyses Philippians 1:22–26 as a tragic *dubitatio*: Paul is rhetorically "torn" between two desires: "to depart" (to die and be with Christ) and "to remain" for the sake of the congregation (Holloway, 2018). The narrative structure shows that for Paul, death is gain because it means "being with Christ"; yet life remains desirable so long as it means "fruitful labour" among the community. In other words, death has positive value only within a relational horizon with Christ and the community; it is not a gain *per se*. Holloway stresses that there is no indication that Paul entertains suicide or *exitus voluntarius* in the Stoic sense; the tension he expresses remains entirely within the space of possibilities defined by God's will, not by an individual's utilitarian calculation (Holloway, 2018). Here, death functions as a mirror of value: if life is centred on Christ, then death signifies an intensification of that relationship; if life is marked by service, then delaying death for the good of others becomes part of obedience. Death, therefore, is no longer determined by the subject's desire to end suffering or preserve honour, but by participation in Christ's mission.

Unlike Philippians, which presents Paul's own existential dilemma, 1 Thessalonians 4:13–18 shows how Paul addresses anxiety about death within the congregation. The believers in Thessalonica are distressed that members of the community who have died before Christ's coming might be disadvantaged eschatologically. Kim shows that 1 Thessalonians 4:13–5:11 can be understood as Paul's attempt to reinterpret traditional sayings of Jesus about the end times in the light of Christ's death and resurrection (Kim, 2002). Paul shifts the focus from *when* the parousia will occur to *how* the death of believers is integrated into the plan of salvation: those who have "fallen asleep" will be raised first, and together with those still alive will "meet the Lord in the air."

Gaventa reads the letter as an exercise in consolation that draws on elements of ancient consolatory rhetoric such as assertions of solidarity, reminders of a hope-filled future, and a reframing of suffering, yet with content radically transformed by belief in Christ's resurrection (Gaventa, 2012).

From a rhetorical perspective, Christian shows that the analytical tools applied to 1 Corinthians 15 can likewise be used for other Pauline letters: the argumentative structure, the use of metaphor, and patterns of consolation indicate that Paul is not only a theologian but also a rhetor who is fully aware of how to shape a message that engages both the intellect and

the affect of his communities (Christian, 2024). This makes Paul's writings highly relevant for contemporary discussions of consolatory rhetoric in the context of religious death anxiety. From the foregoing, it becomes clear that, unlike the Stoic position, for Paul death is not a merely natural fact, but a cosmic enemy and the wages of sin. Yet this enemy has been conquered through Christ's resurrection; 1 Corinthians 15 presents the process of this conquest rhetorically as the climax of the letter. Within Paul's horizon, death can be properly understood only when placed within the framework of bodily resurrection and the renewal of creation. The resurrection he envisages is not the soul's escape from the body, but the transformation of the body into an imperishable form. Wright insists that the resurrection itself is the beginning of the renewal of creation, so that death loses its claim to finality over the world (Wright, 2019).

Accordingly, life is sustained not for the sake of "biological continuity" but for service to the community. Death also becomes a locus of communal consolation: 1 Thessalonians 4 shows how the deaths of church members provide an opportunity to teach a concrete, not merely abstract, eschatological hope. Consolation here does not end with an appeal to the "naturalness" of death, but affirms that God will actively raise and reunite the community of believers. Taken together, this entire vision bears clear relevance for contemporary death anxiety: if modern psychology links fear of death with the loss of meaning and radical uncertainty (Iverach et al., 2014), Paul's theology offers a narrative configuration in which death remains serious yet is no longer absurd. Death is placed within a story that begins with creation, reaches its climax in the cross and resurrection, and moves toward the renewal of creation (Hollon, 2025; Holloway, 2013; Oropeza, 2024; Park, 2020; Wright, 2019).

Compared with Seneca, then, it is evident that Paul cannot be described as merely offering another version of a "training to face death calmly." He invests death with a far more charged theological significance: death is enemy, punishment, and tragic reality; yet precisely as an enemy that has been conquered, death is transformed into a gateway to perfect communion with Christ and into a constitutive part of the process of cosmic renewal. This framework prepares the way for the next stage of the comparative study: placing the concepts of death in Seneca and Paul side by side, not only at the level of formal similarities (meditation on death, consolation, emotion regulation), but also at the level of foundational differences (the moral status of death, the structure of hope, and the locus of salvation). On this basis, a critical analysis can be undertaken of the respective contributions of Seneca and Paul to philosophical–theological reflection on contemporary death anxiety.

Comparative Analysis: Seneca, Paul, and Death

This section brings together the findings of the two preceding sections in a sharper comparative synthesis. The focus is not merely on highlighting thematic similarities such as "do not fear death" or "death can be a gain," but on dissecting the conceptual structures that underlie both approaches. Attention is given to how the ontology of death is understood, how the moral and theological status of death is constructed, how the eschatological horizon is articulated, and how the entire framework is shaped into different modes of consolation.

As background, it is important to recall that recent literature tends to compare Paul and Seneca at the level of consolation and ethics, for example, in Muir, Engberg-Pedersen, or the volume *Paul and Seneca in Dialogue* (Dodson & Briones), but rarely sharpens the comparison specifically around the concept of death itself (A. Muir, 2024).

Accordingly, the analysis below proceeds along four main axes: (1) the ontology and status of death, (2) the eschatological horizon, (3) the subject and the telos of life and death, and (4) consolation and the management of death anxiety.

Ontology and Status of Death. At the ontological level, Seneca and Paul diverge sharply. For Seneca, death is a necessary cosmic fact, part of the causal network (*fatum*) that governs all things. Morally, death belongs to the category of *adiaphora*: it is neither good nor bad; what can be judged good or bad is the inner attitude of the subject facing it. For Paul, by contrast, death is never neutral. It is an enemy (1 Cor 15:26) and the wages of sin (Rom 6:23): terms that explicitly carry negative theological judgment. Park shows that in 1 Corinthians 15, death appears as a personified power allied with sin and the law in enslaving humanity, and therefore must be "destroyed" as part of Christ's subjugation of all enemies (Park, 2020).

This conceptual difference can be summarised as follows: for Seneca, the ontology of death is a change within the order of nature, part of the cosmic *logos*, and its value-status is indifferent, determined by the subject's *ethos*. For Paul, the ontology of death is that of a cosmic power bound up with sin, and its value-status is that of enemy and punishment, which only acquires a positive meaning "in Christ" once it has been conquered. The implications are significant: for Seneca, the primary task is to correct human judgments so that we cease to call "evil" what is metaphysically neutral, whereas for Paul, the primary task is to reposition oneself in Christ so that this objective enemy no longer has a final claim over the human person. From the perspective of death anxiety theory, their approaches proceed via different mechanisms. Seneca reduces anxiety by correcting cognition: death is not a moral threat but a fact of nature; the true threat is a wrongly lived life (Menzies & Whittle, 2022). Paul, by contrast, reduces anxiety by changing the objective status of death through an eschatological narrative of conquest: legitimate fear of a real enemy is replaced by hope because that enemy has been overcome (Oropeza, 2024; Wright, 2019).

Eschatological Horizon. The second difference concerns the classic question of what happens after death. Seneca is notably cautious in eschatological speculation. In his letters and treatises, he sometimes mentions the possibility of the soul's continued existence and sometimes hints that death may mean the termination of existence; but he consistently redirects his readers to pragmatic questions about how to live now. Wesołowska interprets *De brevitate vitae* as an invitation to free oneself from the tyranny of time through philosophical contemplation, rather than through specific eschatological promises (Wesołowska, 2015).

By contrast, Paul's theology is almost impossible to separate from the notion of bodily resurrection. In 1 Corinthians 15, he not only guarantees the continuation of existence, but insists on the transformation of the body into a new mode of being that is imperishable, glorious, and spiritual (1 Cor 15:42–44). Christian and Wright emphasise that Christ's

resurrection is the first fruits of the resurrection of all God's people and the beginning of cosmic renewal (Christian, 2024; Wright, 2019).

Analytically, then, the two thinkers offer different models of horizon. For Seneca, the primary focus lies on the pre-mortem phase (how to live and how to construe time prior to death) while the post-mortem horizon remains relatively open and is not a primary pillar of his therapeutic programme. For Paul, the pre-mortem and post-mortem horizons are tightly interwoven, since the way one lives now is shaped by the certainty of resurrection to come. Bodily resurrection grounds a concrete structure of hope rather than a mere moral symmetry or spiritual metaphor.

Within the framework of Terror Management Theory, religiosity often functions as a source of literal immortality (linked to life after death) and symbolic immortality (linked to meaning within a value system) (Jong, 2021). Seneca offers primarily symbolic immortality: living in accordance with *logos* and virtue, even though the soul's post-mortem status remains uncertain. Paul offers both: literal immortality through bodily resurrection and symbolic immortality through life in Christ and in the community that is his body.

Subject and the Telos of Life and Death. A third difference concerns the question of who the subject is who faces death, and for what he or she lives and dies. In Seneca's construction, the ideal subject is the Stoic sage who attains *autarkeia* (inner self-sufficiency) through rational exercise and emotional discipline. *Meditatio mortis* and tragedy serve to shape a subject who is calm, free from fear (including fear of death), and independent of external circumstances (Graf, 2024a; Novosad, 2024; Weiss, 2021).

For Paul, the ideal subject is not an autonomous individual but a member of the body of Christ. Case argues that the sharpest difference between Paul's and Seneca's ethics of love does not lie in whether love is recognised as risky and painful (both agree on that) but in Paul's insistence that a good life is impossible without union with God in Christ and with the community (Case, 2024). Thus, when Paul declares that "to live is Christ and to die is gain" (Phil 1:21), he is speaking from a relational horizon: life means participation in Christ and service to the church; death means the intensification of that communion, being with Christ.

Analytically, this yields two models of subjectivity. In Seneca, individual integrity and autonomy are maximised; serenity in the face of death signifies that the subject has mastered him- or herself. In Paul, relation and participation are central; courage in the face of death is the fruit of attachment to Christ, who has conquered death, not the product of self-training alone. As a result, even when Paul appears "Stoic" (for example, when he speaks of contentment in all circumstances (Phil 4:11)) Case insists that the nuance is different. For Paul, *autarkeia* is replaced by "sufficiency in him who gives strength." The Christian subject relies on grace coming from outside the self, not simply on internal resources.

Modes of Consolation. Recent literature on Paul and Seneca often revolves around the question of whether they are essentially engaged in the same activity (offering consolation with different content) or whether their modes of consolation themselves differ. Muir proposes that consolation in antiquity is best understood as a tradition and a mode rather than merely a genre: a set of rhetorical and philosophical strategies for responding to suffering and

loss (Muir, 2024). Within this framework, he shows that both Paul and Seneca employ similar argumentative patterns: reordering perspective, reinterpreting suffering and death, and redirecting attention toward the future. Both are also rooted in the practice of letter-writing as a medium for shaping community.

Yet when one turns to content, convergence quickly becomes divergence. Engberg-Pedersen, who compares Philippians and Seneca's *Epistula* 93, insists that beneath the apparent similarity of consolatory structure (an exhortation to look ahead and relativisation of present suffering) the forms of life offered are different. Seneca directs readers toward the ideal of the Stoic *sapiens*, whereas Paul directs them toward participation in the crucified and risen Christ (Engberg-Pedersen, 2017).

Seneca, as Novosad shows, uses exemplary deaths as therapeutic tools: stories of people who die calmly function to reshape the reader's affective responses. Paul, as Muir and Gaventa demonstrate, makes Christ himself the consolatory *exemplum*: Christ's death and resurrection function both as the archetypal pattern to be followed and as the objective ground of hope (Gaventa, 2012; A. Muir, 2024; Novosad, 2024).

Analytically, the difference can be formulated sharply. In Seneca, the mode of consolation is philosophical therapy that transforms how one thinks and feels about death through rational and imaginative exercises. The highest authority is consistency with *logos* and the Stoic tradition. In Paul, the mode of consolation is Christological narrative that transforms how one thinks and feels about death by locating it within the story of the cross, resurrection, and parousia. The highest authority is God's action in history (Christ) and the eschatological promise. On the surface, both offer consolation and seek to reduce fear of death. But when analysis is directed to the foundations of consolation, it becomes clear that they operate with two logics that are almost impossible to reconcile.

Agency over Death. The most sensitive issue in the comparison between Seneca and Paul is the question of suicide. Seneca leaves room for *exitus voluntarius*. Under certain conditions (especially when moral freedom is totally threatened or when physical and psychological suffering has destroyed the capacity for virtuous life) leaving life voluntarily can be a rational and honourable option (Griffiths, 1999; Hill, 2004). Ker shows that Seneca's death, as narrated by Tacitus and received in later tradition, has long been understood as a kind of "performance of philosophical death": Seneca is seen as enacting what he taught about the possibility of choosing death to preserve *libertas* (Ker, 2010).

In Paul's horizon, such a possibility never appears as a conscious option. Philippians 1:21–26 does contain a dilemma as to what is "better": to die and be with Christ, or to live for the sake of the church. Yet, as Holloway shows, this dilemma is placed entirely within the sphere of God's will. Paul never contemplates a deliberate act to end his own life. Life and death lie under God's sovereignty, and the subject's task is to discern vocation, not to calculate morally whether it is "time to exit" (Holloway, 2013).

Analytically, the contrast can be clearly stated. In Seneca, agency over death is relatively extensive: the wise subject may deliberate as to when life is no longer rationally worth continuing, and death can become a final moral act chosen rather than a mere event endured.

In Paul, direct agency over death is minimal: the subject is called to faithfulness in life and readiness to die when God permits. The statement "to die is gain" receives positive meaning only because of the relationship with Christ, not because of the act of choosing death itself.
In the context of contemporary ethics and death anxiety, this difference is highly significant. Seneca's model provides a framework for discussions of autonomy at the end of life, whereas Paul's model is rooted in theological dependence and relationality. The two offer different implications for debates about euthanasia and assisted suicide at the level of conceptual framing rather than normative adjudication.

Death Anxiety. A range of contemporary psychological studies show that fear of death plays a transdiagnostic role in various psychological disorders, as Iverach and colleagues have demonstrated (Iverach et al., 2014). Other research stresses that religiosity and belief in life after death can either reduce or intensify anxiety, depending on the quality of belief and the degree of ambivalence involved (Connery & Murphy, 2025; Jong, 2021; Nelson & Cantrell, 1980). Within this landscape, the views of Seneca and Paul can be seen as two distinct architectures for managing death anxiety.

Seneca's model operates within a Stoic, cognitively inflected horizon. It normalises death as part of the order of nature and reduces its threat-loading through cognitive restructuring and imaginative exercise, as discussed by Novosad and Hoffpauir. Menzies and Whittle show that strategies bear structural affinities with cognitive–behavioural therapy: they challenge irrational thoughts, provide targeted exposure to the idea of death, and help clarify life-values as psychological anchors.

Paul's model has a fundamentally different structure. Within a Christological–relational framework, death is not construed as a neutral fact but as an enemy that has been overcome by the power of Christ's resurrection. Hope replaces fear through an eschatological narrative of new life, and the stance toward death is understood in relational terms: relation to Christ and relation to the community. This direction is consistent with Case, Muir, Kim, and Wibowo, who highlight the communal and Christological dimensions in Paul's understanding of death. Studies by Pandya and Husain indicate that religious beliefs that are well-integrated tend to correlate with greater acceptance of death and reduced anxiety.

Both approaches offer therapeutic responses to death anxiety, but their mechanisms differ. Seneca seeks to reduce anxiety by lowering the perceived threat-significance attached to death and by enhancing the sense of inner control. Paul does so by altering the ontological status of death from an absolute threat to a conquered enemy, and by placing the individual within a web of relationships that extends beyond the biological limits of death. Jong's findings caution that the impact of religiosity is not always linear: ambivalent belief can heighten anxiety. Thus, Paul's model works effectively only when faith in Christ and in the resurrection is genuinely integrated into an overarching framework of life-meaning. Conversely, Seneca's approach can fail if the neutrality of death is grasped only superficially, without the consistent discipline of inner training.

Implications of the Comparative Findings

This section draws out the implications of the foregoing comparative analysis by making explicit how Seneca's and Paul's respective construals of death structure distinct ethical trajectories and consolatory logics. To avoid impressionistic comparison, Table 1 summarises the results along a set of shared analytical dimensions (ontological status, moral valence, temporality, agency, and consolatory mechanism) and indicates the most immediate implications that follow from each position.

Table 1. Implications of Seneca's and Paul's Construals of Death

Analytical dimension	Seneca (Roman Stoicism)	Paul (Pauline theology)	Implication of the contrast
Ontological status of death	A natural, cosmically given event; not intrinsically evil; located within the order of nature.	An enemy within a redemptive-historical horizon; defeated through Christ yet experientially operative ("already/not yet").	Similar consolatory aims can conceal fundamentally different metaphysical grammars: *neutrality within nature* versus *defeat within eschatology*.
Moral valence	Death is *indifferens*; moral value lies in judgement and virtue, not the event.	Death is morally negative as enemy, yet for believers it can be "gain" by virtue of union with Christ and promised resurrection.	Consolation is grounded either in revaluation (death as non-evil) or in re-narration (death as conquered enemy and gateway).
Primary locus of agency	Inner assent/judgement, self-governance, and disciplined use of time.	Participation "in Christ," reconfigured identity, and hope anchored in divine action/resurrection promise.	Two agency models emerge: self-formative moral agency (Stoic) versus participatory/relational agency (Pauline).
Temporal orientation	Strong emphasis on present ethical use of time; death as pedagogical boundary that clarifies priorities.	Hope-oriented temporality; present life interpreted through future resurrection and consummation.	Death motivates either intensified present virtue (Stoic) or present endurance shaped by future-directed hope (Pauline).
Function of death in moral formation	Pedagogical: exposes illusion, trains detachment, sharpens virtue and time stewardship.	Theologically interpretive: discloses the limits of the present age; frames suffering and endurance within resurrection hope.	Both are formative, but formation proceeds via different "engines": cognitive-moral discipline vs eschatological identity/hope.
Consolatory mechanism	Cognitive reappraisal: redefine death's value; reduce fear by correcting false judgements and attachments.	Narrative–eschatological assurance: death is addressed through resurrection logic and communion with Christ.	The mechanisms are not interchangeable: Stoic consolation stabilises affect via appraisal; Pauline consolation stabilises affect via promise and belonging.

Affective target	Tranquillitas/apatheia (freedom from disordered passions).	Courage/steadfastness shaped by hope; fear is not simply "irrational" but re-situated within victory narrative.	Different affective ideals imply different evaluative standards for "successful consolation."
Individual vs communal dimension	Predominantly individual ethical training (even when addressed to others).	Strong communal horizon (church, shared hope, mutual consolation).	Comparative results imply distinct pastoral forms: personal philosophical exercises versus communal practices of hope.
Ethical upshot	Preparation for death as part of living well; death is "nothing to fear" if judgement is corrected.	Preparation for death as faithful living; death is faced as enemy yet not ultimate, because resurrection redefines the end.	Both encourage fear-reduction, but by different routes: neutrality (Stoic) vs victory/hope (Pauline).
Interdisciplinary relevance to death anxiety (conceptual)	Suggests a pathway emphasising appraisal, control of judgement, and detachment from externals.	Suggests a pathway emphasising meaning, relational identity, and future-oriented hope.	Offers two conceptually distinct "meaning frameworks" for analysing how death interpretations may shape fear/acceptance of mortality.
Scope and limits of inference	Textual-philosophical model; does not claim clinical efficacy.	Textual-theological model; does not claim clinical efficacy.	Keeps implications rigorous: relevance is conceptual and hypothesis-generating, not direct clinical prescription.

Theoretical implications for Paul–Seneca comparison. The comparative results indicate that the most consequential divergence between Seneca and Paul is not merely rhetorical but metaphysical: death is positioned either as a cosmically neutral event (indifferens) or as an eschatologically defeated enemy. This entails that similarities in consolatory form (e.g., exhortation, reframing of loss, appeal to endurance) cannot be treated as evidence of shared substance. Any rigorous comparison must therefore distinguish (i) the surface convergence of consolatory rhetoric from (ii) the deep divergence in death's ontological and moral status. Methodologically, this supports reading Paul–Seneca parallels as instances of shared ancient consolatory conventions operating under different "world-grammars."

Ethical–practical implications for formation and consolation. On Seneca's model, the ethical project is to cultivate a stable inner disposition through disciplined judgement and time stewardship; death functions as a boundary condition that exposes illusion, relativises externals, and trains detachment. On Paul's model, the ethical project is to inhabit a reconfigured identity "in Christ," where death is neither denied nor neutralised but interpreted through resurrection promise; consolation is thereby oriented toward steadfastness shaped by hope rather than toward the Stoic ideal of affective invulnerability. Practically, this yields two

distinct trajectories of "learning to die": (a) a pedagogy of cognitive–moral training that targets erroneous valuations (Seneca), and (b) a pedagogy of faithful endurance grounded in eschatological assurance and communal participation (Paul). The implication is that interpretive frameworks of death are not ancillary but structurally determinative for the kind of moral subject each tradition aims to form.

Interdisciplinary implications for contemporary discourse on death anxiety. Conceptually (and without claiming direct clinical transfer), the comparison clarifies how divergent death-meanings can organise distinct pathways toward mortality acceptance. A Senecan framework foregrounds appraisal and locus-of-control at the level of judgement: fear is treated as the product of false evaluation of death and disordered attachment to externals. A Pauline framework foregrounds meaning and relational identity: fear is addressed not by rendering death morally neutral, but by situating it within a victory narrative and a future-oriented hope anchored in resurrection. The present study therefore contributes a historically grounded typology of death-interpretations that can sharpen contemporary discussions in psychology of religion regarding how metaphysical commitments and meaning systems shape consolation practices and responses to mortality.

CONCLUSION

This study shows that Seneca and Paul both seek to alleviate anxiety about death and to orient human life toward the good, yet they do so within fundamentally different conceptual frameworks. Seneca, within the Roman Stoic tradition, understands death as a rational and natural fact that is morally neutral (*adiaphoron*), whose significance is determined by the subject's attitudes and judgments. Through *meditatio mortis* and exemplary deaths, he proposes a philosophical therapy aimed at correcting judgments, disciplining the emotions, and attaining inner tranquillity and freedom. Paul, by contrast, understands death as a cosmic enemy and the "wages of sin," overcome through the death and resurrection of Christ. Within this Christological–eschatological horizon, death remains the last enemy yet becomes, for those "in Christ," a "gain," as it opens into deeper communion with Christ and the renewal of creation. These differences yield two distinct architectures for addressing death anxiety: Stoic inner mastery through the normalization of death, and Christian reconfiguration of death's meaning within a relational and eschatological vision of the self.

These comparative findings also carry practical implications for pastoral accompaniment and Christian counseling. A Senecan framework can support stabilizing practices of cognitive reappraisal by clarifying the distinction between what lies within human control and what does not, thereby directing ethical attention to what remains possible in the present. A Pauline framework, on the other hand, situates grief and fear within communal and eschatological horizons, in which death is neither denied nor rendered morally indifferent but held within the narrative of its defeat in Christ and the promise of resurrection. Accordingly, Christian pastoral practice may draw on Stoic-inspired reflective exercises as ancillary tools, while grounding consolation and courage not in self-sufficiency but in participation "in Christ," future-oriented hope, and the cultivation of love as the form of faithful endurance.

REFERENCES

Case, B. (2024). Love's Limits in Paul of Tarsus and Seneca the Younger. *Religions*, *15*(10). https://doi.org/10.3390/REL15101169

Christian, T. J. (2024). The Historical Approach to New Testament Rhetorical Criticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of 1 Corinthians 15. *Religions*, *15*(1), 88. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15010088

Connery, T., & Murphy, M. (2025). Be not afraid?: death anxiety and religious residue in Christian and non-religious participants. *Mortality*, *30*(4), 902–917. https://doi.org/10.1080/13576275.2024.2418351

Coomans, D. (2024). Mors Individva and Aeqva (Seneca, Troades 401 And 434). *Classical Quarterly*, *74*(1), 364–365. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838824000235

Currie, M. (2020). Seneca on the Death of M. Livius Drusus (De brevitate vitae 6.1-2). *Mnemosyne*, *73*(5), 775–797. https://doi.org/10.1163/1568525X-12342754)

Edwards, C. (2007). Inwood Reading Seneca. Stoic Philosophy at Rome. *The Classical Review*, *57*(1), 118–120. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009840X06003489

Engberg-Pedersen, T. (2017). Paul in Philippians and Seneca in Epistle 93 on Life after Death and Its Present Implications. *Paul and Seneca in Dialogue*, 267–284. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004341364_014)

Fantham, E. (2019). Death and The Dead In Seneca's Troades. *Seneca's Troades*, 78–92. https://doi.org/10.2307/J.CTVCMXS1T.9

Gaventa, B. R. (2012). *First and Second Thessalonians*. Westminster John Knox Press. https://books.google.com/books/about/First_and_Second_Thessalonians.html?hl=id&id=57zQq1n-_1AC

Graf, C. (2024a). Natural Disaster, Stupefaction, and Anxiety. *Seneca's Affective Cosmos*, 53–83. https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198907008.003.0003

Graf, C. (2024b). Oedipus Haerens: Paranoid Lagging in Seneca's Phoenissae*. *Classical Antiquity*, *43*(1), 19–49. https://doi.org/10.1525/CA.2024.43.1.19

Griffiths, P. J. (1999). How Epistemology Matters to Theology. In *Source: The Journal of Religion* (Vol. 79, Issue 1). https://www.jstor.org/stable/1207040

Hill, T. D. (2004). *Ambitiosa Mors*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203492840

Hoffpauir, J. M. (2021). The Road to Freedom. In *Political Theory on Death and Dying* (pp. 121–131). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003005384-13

Hollon, E. L. (2025). *Paul's Account Of Change At The Resurrection In 1 Corinthians 15:42-44A*. 72–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.14385

Holloway, P. A. (2013). Paul as a hellenistic philosopher: The evidence of philippians. *Paul and the Philosophers*, 52–68. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780823292325-003/HTML

Holloway, P. A. (2018). Deliberating Life and Death: Paul's Tragic Dubitatio in Philippians 1:22–26. *Harvard Theological Review*, *111*(2), 174–191. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0017816018000044

Husain, W., Ammar, A., Trabelsi, K., & Jahrami, H. (2024). Development and validation of Believers' Death Anxiety Scale: integrating religious dimensions into death anxiety assessment. *Discover Mental Health*, *4*(1), 64. https://doi.org/10.1007/S44192-024-00120-2)

Husain, W., Malik, M. M., Shakeel, A., Riaz, A., Mahnoor, & Jahrami, H. (2024). The Psychopathological Predictors and Effects of Death Anxiety. *Omega (United States)*. https://doi.org/10.1177/00302228241272502

Iverach, L., Menzies, R. G., & Menzies, R. E. (2014). Death anxiety and its role in psychopathology: Reviewing the status of a transdiagnostic construct. *Clinical Psychology Review*, *34*(7), 580–593. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CPR.2014.09.002)

Jong, J. (2021). Death anxiety and religion. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *40*, 40–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.08.004

Ker, J. (2009a). *The Deaths of Seneca*. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780195387032.001.0001)

Ker, J. (2009b). *The Deaths of Seneca*. Oxford University PressNew York. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387032.001.0001

Ker, J. (2010). The Deaths of Seneca. *The Deaths of Seneca*, 1–448. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780195387032.001.0001

Kim, S. (2002). The Jesus Tradition in 1 Thess 4.13–5.11. *New Testament Studies*, *48*(2), 225–242. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028688502000164

Luckensmeyer, D., & Neil, B. (2015). Reading first thessalonians as a consolatory letter in light of Seneca and ancient handbooks on letter-writing. *New Testament Studies*, *62*(1), 31–48. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028688515000351

Menzies, R. E., & Whittle, L. F. (2022). Stoicism and death acceptance: integrating Stoic philosophy in cognitive behaviour therapy for death anxiety. *Discover Psychology*, *2*(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/S44202-022-00023-9

Muir, A. (2024). *Paul and Seneca within the Ancient Consolation Tradition*. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004695528)

Muir, A. W. (2022). "Our πολίτευμα Belongs in Heaven" (Phil 3:20). *Novum Testamentum*, *64*(2), 249–266. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685365-BJA10011)

Muir, A. W. (2024a). Comparing Paul and Seneca on Consolation: How and Why. *Paul and Seneca within the Ancient Consolation Tradition*, 20–41. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004695528_003

Muir, A. W. (2024b). Defining Consolation in Antiquity: Traditions and Modes. *Paul and Seneca within the Ancient Consolation Tradition*, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004695528_002

Nelson, L. D., & Cantrell, C. H. (1980). Religiosity and Death Anxiety: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis. *Review of Religious Research*, *21*(2), 148. https://doi.org/10.2307/3509880

Novosad, D. (2024). Seneca's Use of Exempla as Therapeutics for Fear of Death in Moral Epistles. *Folia Philosophica*, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.31261/FP.18189)

Noyes, R. (1973). Seneca on death. *Journal of Religion & Health*, *12*(3), 223–240. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01532829

Oropeza, B. J. (2024). The Gospel According to Paul: Over a Hundred Years of Interpretation. *Religions*, *15*(12), 1566. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15121566

Pandya, A. K., & Kathuria, T. (2021). Death anxiety, religiosity and culture: Implications for therapeutic process and future research. *Religions*, *12*(1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.3390/REL12010061

Park, J. (2020). The Identity of Death in 1 Corinthians 15:20–28: Understanding the Cosmic and Forensic Dimensions of Death in Paul. 신약연구, *19*(1), 194–232. https://doi.org/10.24229/KENTS.2020.19.1.006

Pypłacz, J. (2016). Cyntia żywa i Cyntia umarła. Literacka gra z odbiorcą w elegii 4.7 Propercjusza. *Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae*, *26*(1), 93. https://doi.org/10.14746/SPPGL.2016.XXVI.1.5

Weiss, R. L. (2021). Senecan Tragedy as Response to Stoic Critique. *Journal of European Languages and Literatures*. https://interface.org.tw/index.php/if/article/view/130/459

Wesołowska, E. (2015). Seneca in search of passing time. *Classica Cracoviensia*, *18*, 475–490.

Wibowo, M., & Salurante, T. (2020). Kajian Biblika 1 Korintus 15: 1-11 Bagi Pemahaman Iman Kristen Tentang Kebangkitan Yesus Kristus. *Manna Rafflesia*, *7*(1), 90–115. https://doi.org/10.38091/man_raf.v7i1.136

Wright, N. T. (2019). Resurrection and the Renewal of Creation. *The Biblical Annals*, *9*(4), 655–670. https://doi.org/10.31743/biban.4784